Evidence: historical governance case. Imported from the supplied 65-Case Master Edition, dated September 19, 2026. Source links and classifications are retained as an attributed case account; import is not an independent source review.
Case at a glance
- Case number
- 028
- Date / range
- 2013
- Sector
- Law enforcement and forensic genetics
- Genetic asset
- Arrestee cheek swab and forensic profile
- Security principle
- Collection Threshold and Purpose Expansion
Event summary
In 2013 the U.S. Supreme Court upheld, under the circumstances before it, Maryland's collection of a DNA cheek swab from an arrestee charged with a serious offense as a reasonable booking procedure.
Source: Court opinion — Maryland v. King.
Source: Court opinion — Maryland v. King.
The case in context
Maryland v. King addressed a cheek swab collected after an arrest for a serious offense. The majority's booking-identification rationale and the dissent's concerns about crime-solving purposes reveal the importance of specifying what a collection is intended to accomplish.
The physical act of swabbing, the profile generated from it, and any retained specimen should remain separate in the analysis. The decision does not authorize universal sequencing or unlimited analysis. Its value in this collection is as a bounded legal example of how collection thresholds and stated purposes shape a forensic data system.
Acquisition and processing
serious-offense arrest → cheek swab → forensic profile → database search → cold-case hit → prosecution
The sequence of events
- serious-offense arrest
- cheek swab
- forensic profile
- database search
- cold-case hit
- prosecution
What became inferable or exposed
Arrestee cheek swab and forensic profile
In 2013 the U.S. Supreme Court upheld, under the circumstances before it, Maryland's collection of a DNA cheek swab from an arrestee charged with a serious offense as a reasonable booking procedure.
Affected parties and consent
- Direct parties
- The arrestee in the case and people covered by the collection law
- Indirect parties
- Relatives and connected participants may be relevant where the asset contains relationship information.
- Direct count
- Unknown / not assigned
- Indirect count
- Unknown / not assigned
- Consent status
- The authority for collection and comparison must be assessed in the specific investigative or legal context; affected relatives may not have participated themselves.
Security dimensions
Confidentiality
The confidentiality question concerns arrestee cheek swab and forensic profile. Exposure and further inference must be distinguished from the fact of collection or availability.
Integrity
The integrity question is whether the described material, permissions, processing, or interpretation can be relied upon. Collection Threshold and Purpose Expansion identifies the particular boundary examined here.
Availability
Access and continuity are assessed for the described event; potential effects are not presented as confirmed outages or losses.
Provenance
The relevant chain follows arrestee cheek swab and forensic profile through the stages shown below. Missing public detail is not proof that internal records did not exist.
Consent, persistence, and relational exposure
Consent
The authority for collection and comparison must be assessed in the specific investigative or legal context; affected relatives may not have participated themselves.
Persistence
Later reuse depends on the actual asset and links to other records; no future misuse is asserted.
Relational exposure
Relatives and connected participants may be relevant where the asset contains relationship information.
Case-specific assessment
confidentiality high; integrity/provenance high; availability supports public safety; consent absent; persistence high.
GeneticSecurity.org analysis
Genetic Exposure Radius
No single level is assigned where the supplied dossier gives a range, conditional outcome, or broad institutional consequence. The affected parties and proposed assessment are shown separately.
Confidence: not assigned. Classification: GeneticSecurity.org analysis.
Genetic Persistence Risk
Persistence depends on the specific biological material or information retained. A potential effect is not treated as an observed genomic disclosure.
Confidence: not assigned. Classification: GeneticSecurity.org analysis.
Genetic Provenance Integrity
A numeric provenance level is not inferred from the existence of a source or court record. It requires evidence of the relevant custody and processing controls.
Confidence: not assigned. Classification: GeneticSecurity.org analysis.
Proposed classification and its limits
Suggested GER: GER-1. Suggested GPR: GPR-3 for a limited profile, GPR-5 if the biological sample remains available. Suggested GPI: GPI-4.
These are proposed classifications from the supplied case dossier. Conditional scores describe an assumed exposure; they are not evidence that it occurred. A single numeric value is left unassigned when the asset or outcome is not sufficiently bounded.
What this case does not prove
It does not approve universal sequencing, collection from everyone, every arrest category, or unrestricted analysis of retained samples.
Mitigations and lessons
- Statutory scope limits
- Profile/sample separation
- Expungement
- Analysis restrictions
- Audit trails
- Accreditation
- Warrants for uses outside the authorized purpose
Primary sources
- PRIMARY SOURCE Court opinion — Maryland v. King
- PRIMARY SOURCE Court opinion — Maryland v. King
Secondary sources
No additional source listed. See the evidence notes for limitations.
Policy and standards
Genetic Security Policy and StandardsReview and correction history
Source edition: September 19, 2026. Imported case account; no substantive corrections recorded.
Correction policy and logCite this case
GS-CASE-028. Maryland v. King: When a Cheek Swab Became Booking Identification. GeneticSecurity.org. https://geneticsecurity.org/cases/028-maryland-king-arrestee-dna/